Are Boards Designed to Fail? The Implausibility of Effective Board Monitoring

Academy of Management Annals

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 2016, Pages 319-407

  Boivie, Steven ^a   Bednar, Michael K ^b   Aguilera, Ruth V ^c   Andrus, Joel L ^a  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^c ESADE BUSINESS SCHOOL   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84958069060     PISSN: 19416520     EISSN: 19416067     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/19416520.2016.1120957     Document Type: Review

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