Does good governance prevent bad strategy? A study of corporate governance, financial diversification, and value creation by French corporations, 2000-2006

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 34, Issue 7, 2013, Pages 863-876

  Castañer, Xavier ^a   Kavadis, Nikolaos ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LAUSANNE   (Switzerland)

^b ERASMUS UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

corporate governance; corporate strategy; incentives; monitoring; value creation

Indexed keywords

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; CORPORATE STRATEGIES; GOOD GOVERNANCES; INCENTIVES; INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS; PERCEIVED RISK; SHAREHOLDER RETURNS; VALUE CREATION;

INDUSTRY; MONITORING;

FINANCE;

EID: 84878276503     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.2040     Document Type: Review

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