Director reputation, CEO-board power, and the dynamics of board interlocks

Administrative Science Quarterly

Volumn 41, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 507-529

  Zajac, Edward J ^b   Westphal, James D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030243417     PISSN: 00018392     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2393940     Document Type: Article

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