The Labor Market for Directors and Externalities in Corporate Governance

Journal of Finance

Volumn 71, Issue 2, 2016, Pages 775-808

  Levit, Doron ^a   Malenko, Nadya ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84961247068     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12287     Document Type: Article

References (57)

1. Acemoglu, Daron, 1996, A microfoundation for social increasing returns in human capital accumulation, Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, 779-804.
2. Acharya, Viral V., Marc Gabarro, and Paolo F. Volpin, 2013, Competition for managers, corporate governance and incentive compensation, Working paper, New York University.
3. Acharya, Viral V., and Paolo F. Volpin, 2010, Corporate governance externalities, Review of Finance 14, 1-33.
4. Adams, Renée B., and Daniel Ferreira, 2007, A theory of friendly boards, Journal of Finance 62, 217-250.
5. Adams, Renée B., Benjamin E. Hermalin, and Michael S. Weisbach, 2010, The role of boards of directors in corporate governance: A conceptual framework and survey, Journal of Economic Literature 48, 58-107.
6. Albuquerque, Rui, Luis Brandao Marques, Miguel A. Ferreira, and Pedro Matos, 2014, International corporate governance spillovers: Evidence from cross-border mergers and acquisitions, Working paper, Boston University.
7. Austen-Smith, David, and Roland G. Fryer Jr., 2005, An economic analysis of "acting white, " Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 551-583.
8. Bar-Isaac, Heski, and Joyee Deb, 2014, (Good and bad) reputation for a servant of two masters, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6, 293-325.
9. Benhabib, Jess, and Roger E. A. Farmer, 1994, Indeterminacy and increasing returns, Journal of Economic Theory 63, 19-41.
10. Bouvard, Matthieu, and Raphaël Levy, 2013, Two-sided reputation in certification markets, Working paper, McGill University.
11. Bouwman, Christa H. S., 2011, Corporate governance propagation through overlapping directors, Review of Financial Studies 24, 2358-2394.
12. Burkart, Michael, and Konrad Raff, 2015, Performance pay, CEO dismissal and the dual role of takeovers, Review of Finance 19, 1383-1414.
13. Chakraborty, Archishman, and Bilge Yilmaz, 2013, Authority, consensus and governance, Working paper, University of Pennsylvania.
14. Cheng, Ing-Haw, 2011, Corporate governance spillovers, Working paper, Dartmouth College.
15. Coles, Jeffrey L., and Chun-Keung Hoi, 2003, New evidence on the market for directors: Board membership and Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310, Journal of Finance 58, 197-230.
16. Dass, Nishant, Omesh Kini, Vikram Nanda, Bunyamin Onal, and Jun Wang, 2014, Board expertise: Do directors from related industries help bridge the information gap? Review of Financial Studies 27, 1533-1592.
17. Dewatripont, Mathias, Ian Jewitt, and Jean Tirole, 1999, The economics of career concerns, part II: Application to missions and accountability of government agencies, Review of Economic Studies 66, 199-217.
18. Diamond, Peter A., 1982, Aggregate demand management in search equilibrium, Journal of Political Economy 90, 881-894.
19. Dicks, David L., 2012, Executive compensation and the role for corporate governance regulation, Review of Financial Studies 25, 1971-2004.
20. Eminet, Aurélien, and Zied Guedri, 2010, The role of nominating committees and director reputation in shaping the labor market for directors: An empirical assessment, Corporate Governance: An International Review 18, 557-574.
21. Ertimur, Yonca, Fabrizio Ferri, and David A. Maber, 2012, Reputation penalties for poor monitoring of executive pay: Evidence from option backdating, Journal of Financial Economics 104, 118-144.
22. Ertimur, Yonca, Fabrizio Ferri, and Stephen R. Stubben, 2010, Board of directors' responsiveness to shareholders: Evidence from shareholder proposals, Journal of Corporate Finance 16, 53-72.
23. Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, 2009, Shareholder rights, boards, and CEO compensation, Review of Finance 13, 81-113.
24. Fich, Eliezer M., and Anil Shivdasani, 2007, Financial fraud, director reputation, and shareholder wealth, Journal of Financial Economics 86, 306-336.
25. Fos, Vyacheslav, and Margarita Tsoutsoura, 2014, Shareholder democracy in play: Career consequences of proxy contests, Journal of Financial Economics 114, 316-340.
26. Frenkel, Sivan, 2015, Repeated interaction and rating inflation: A model of double reputation, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7, 250-280.
27. Gertner, Robert, Robert Gibbons, and David Scharfstein, 1988, Simultaneous signalling to the capital and product markets, RAND Journal of Economics 19, 173-190.
28. Grossman, Sanford, and Oliver Hart, 1986, The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration, Journal of Political Economy 94, 691-719.
29. Harford, Jarrad, 2003, Takeover bids and target directors' incentives: The impact of a bid on directors' wealth and board seats, Journal of Financial Economics 69, 51-83.
30. Harris, Milton, and Artur Raviv, 2008, A theory of board control and size, Review of Financial Studies 21, 1797-1832.
31. Hart, Oliver, and John Moore, 1990, Property rights and the theory of the firm, Journal of Political Economy 98, 1119-1158.
32. Helland, Eric, 2006, Reputational penalties and the merits of class-action securities litigation, Journal of Law and Economics 49, 365-395.
33. Hermalin, Benjamin E., and Michael S. Weisbach, 1998, Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO, American Economic Review 88, 96-118.
34. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1999, Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective, Review of Economic Studies 66, 169-182.
35. Jiang, Wei, Hualin Wan, and Shan Zhao, 2016, Reputation concerns of independent directors: Evidence from individual director voting, Review of Financial Studies 29, 655-696.
36. Knyazeva, Anzhela, Diana Knyazeva, and Ronald W. Masulis, 2013, The supply of corporate directors and board independence, Review of Financial Studies 26, 1561-1605.
37. Kreps, David M., 1990, A Course in Microeconomic Theory (Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, NY).
38. Laing, Derek, Theodore Palivos, and Ping Wang, 1995, Learning, matching and growth, Review of Economic Studies 62, 115-129.
39. Lel, Ugur, and Darius P. Miller, 2015, The market for director reputation around the world: Evidence from shocks to international reputation, Working paper, Southern Methodist University.
40. Levit, Doron, 2012, Expertise, structure, and reputation of corporate boards, Working paper, University of Pennsylvania.
41. Lorsch, Jay W., and Elizabeth MacIver, 1989, Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of America's Corporate Boards (Harvard Business School Press, Boston).
42. Malenko, Nadya, 2014, Communication and decision-making in corporate boards, Review of Financial Studies 27, 1486-1532.
43. Marshall, Cassandra, 2011, Are dissenting directors rewarded? Working paper, University of Richmond.
44. Matveyev, Egor, 2013, How do firms and directors choose each other? Evidence from a two-sided matching model of the director labor market, Working paper, University of Alberta.
45. Nielsen, Anders E. B., 2006, Evolution of corporate governance, externalities and multiple equilibria, Working paper, Princeton University.
46. Ordonez, Guillermo L., 2013, Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking, Theoretical Economics 8, 653-700.
47. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), 2003, White paper on corporate governance in Asia (Paris: OECD).
48. Ruiz-Verdu, Pablo, and Ravi Singh, 2014, Board reputation, CEO pay, and camouflaged compensation, Working paper, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
49. Scharfstein, David S., and Jeremy C. Stein, 1990, Herd behavior and investment, American Economic Review 80, 465-479.
50. Song, Fenghua, and Anjan V. Thakor, 2006, Information control, career concerns, and corporate governance, Journal of Finance 61, 1845-1896.
51. Srinivasan, Suraj, 2005, Consequences of financial reporting failure for outside directors: Evidence from accounting restatements and audit committee members, Journal of Accounting Research 43, 291-334.
52. Vives, Xavier, 2005, Complementarities and games: New developments, Journal of Economic Literature 43, 437-479.
53. Warther, Vincent A., 1998, Board effectiveness and board dissent: A model of the board's relationship to management and shareholders, Journal of Corporate Finance 4, 53-70.
54. Yermack, David, 1996, Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors, Journal of Financial Economics 40, 185-211.
55. Yermack, David, 2004, Remuneration, retention, and reputation incentives for outside directors, Journal of Finance 59, 2281-2308.
56. Zajac, Edward J., and James D. Westphal, 1996, Director reputation, CEO-board power, and the dynamics of board interlocks, Administrative Science Quarterly 41, 507-529.
57. Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1995, Corporate conservatism and relative compensation, Journal of Political Economy 103, 1-25.