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Volumn 53, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 113-142

Board meeting frequency and firm performance

Author keywords

Board meeting frequency; Board of directors; Corporate governance; G30; G39

Indexed keywords


EID: 0001155473     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(99)00018-5     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (1177)

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