Hiring cheerleaders: Board appointments of "independent" directors

Management Science

Volumn 58, Issue 6, 2012, Pages 1039-1058

  Cohen, Lauren ^a   Frazzini, Andrea ^b   Malloy, Christopher J ^a  

^a HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

^b AQR Capital Management   (United States)

Author keywords

Analysts; Appointments; Board members; Independent directors

Indexed keywords

ANALYSTS; APPOINTMENTS; BOARD MEMBERS; CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER COMPENSATIONS; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS;

MANAGEMENT; MANAGEMENT SCIENCE;

INDUSTRY;

EID: 84862667584     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1483     Document Type: Article

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