Deciding who will rule: Examining the influence of outside noncore directors on executive entrenchment

Organization Science

Volumn 25, Issue 6, 2014, Pages 1662-1683

  Kang, Eugene ^a   Kroll, Mark ^b  

^a NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT BROWNSVILLE   (United States)

Author keywords

Boards of directors; Corporate elite; Corporate governance; Directorial labor market; Executive entrenchment

Indexed keywords

EID: 84911410054     PISSN: 10477039     EISSN: 15265455     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/orsc.2013.0874     Document Type: Article

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