I know something you don't know!: The role of linking pin directors in monitoring and incentive alignment

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 37, Issue 5, 2016, Pages 964-981

  Brandes, Pamela ^a   Dharwadkar, Ravi ^a   Suh, Sanghyun ^b  

^a SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

Author keywords

agency conflicts; board committees; boards; executive compensation; monitoring

Indexed keywords

MONITORING; PLANNING;

AGENCY CONFLICTS; BOARD COMMITTEES; BOARDS; EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION; INCENTIVE ALIGNMENT; KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER; LINKING PINS; REGULATORY PRESSURE;

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT;

EID: 84945207906     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.2353     Document Type: Article

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