메뉴 건너뛰기




Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 79-92

Common Membership and Effective Corporate Governance: Evidence from Audit and Compensation Committees

Author keywords

Audit Committee; Common Membership; Compensation Committee; Corporate Governance

Indexed keywords


EID: 84871917077     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/corg.12000     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (58)

References (84)
  • 2
    • 30344469920 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Corporate governance and accounting scandals
    • Agrawal, A. & Chadha, S. 2005. Corporate governance and accounting scandals. Journal of Law and Economics, 48: 371-406.
    • (2005) Journal of Law and Economics , vol.48 , pp. 371-406
    • Agrawal, A.1    Chadha, S.2
  • 3
    • 31144441417 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Active institutional shareholders and costs of monitoring: Evidence from executive compensation
    • Almazan, A., Hartzell, J. C., & Starks, L. T. 2005. Active institutional shareholders and costs of monitoring: Evidence from executive compensation. Financial Management, 34(4): 5-34.
    • (2005) Financial Management , vol.34 , Issue.4 , pp. 5-34
    • Almazan, A.1    Hartzell, J.C.2    Starks, L.T.3
  • 4
    • 0038353971 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • An empirical examination of the role of the CEO and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay
    • Anderson, R. & Bizjak, J. 2003. An empirical examination of the role of the CEO and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay. Journal of Banking & Finance, 27: 1323-1348.
    • (2003) Journal of Banking & Finance , vol.27 , pp. 1323-1348
    • Anderson, R.1    Bizjak, J.2
  • 5
    • 11144307937 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Board characteristics, accounting report integrity, and the cost of debt
    • Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A., & Reeb, D. M. 2004. Board characteristics, accounting report integrity, and the cost of debt. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37: 315-342.
    • (2004) Journal of Accounting and Economics , vol.37 , pp. 315-342
    • Anderson, R.C.1    Mansi, S.A.2    Reeb, D.M.3
  • 7
    • 0030305316 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud
    • Beasley, M. S. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review, 71: 443-465.
    • (1996) The Accounting Review , vol.71 , pp. 443-465
    • Beasley, M.S.1
  • 9
    • 8744264917 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The effect of audit committee expertise, independence, and activity on aggressive earnings management
    • Bedard, J., Chtourou, S., & Courteau, L. 2004. The effect of audit committee expertise, independence, and activity on aggressive earnings management. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 23: 13-37.
    • (2004) Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory , vol.23 , pp. 13-37
    • Bedard, J.1    Chtourou, S.2    Courteau, L.3
  • 12
    • 84871900963 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Corporate governance contagion through overlapping directors. Working paper, Case Western Reserve University.
    • Bouwman, C. 2008. Corporate governance contagion through overlapping directors. Working paper, Case Western Reserve University.
    • (2008)
    • Bouwman, C.1
  • 15
    • 29244483408 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting
    • Burns, N. & Kedia, S. 2006. The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting. Journal of Financial Economics, 79: 35-67.
    • (2006) Journal of Financial Economics , vol.79 , pp. 35-67
    • Burns, N.1    Kedia, S.2
  • 16
    • 0032116927 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior
    • Bushee, B. J. 1998. The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior. The Accounting Review, 73: 305-333.
    • (1998) The Accounting Review , vol.73 , pp. 305-333
    • Bushee, B.J.1
  • 17
    • 0141907398 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Audit committee independence and disclosure: Choice for financially distressed firms
    • Carcello, J. & Neal, T. 2003. Audit committee independence and disclosure: Choice for financially distressed firms. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11: 289-299.
    • (2003) Corporate Governance: An International Review , vol.11 , pp. 289-299
    • Carcello, J.1    Neal, T.2
  • 18
    • 0036406628 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Factors associated with the development of board sub-committees
    • Carson, E. 2002. Factors associated with the development of board sub-committees. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 10: 4-18.
    • (2002) Corporate Governance: An International Review , vol.10 , pp. 4-18
    • Carson, E.1
  • 19
    • 84871856072 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Does overlapping membership on audit and compensation committees improve a firm's financial reporting quality? Working paper, Drexel University.
    • Chandar, N., Chang, H., & Zheng, X. 2008. Does overlapping membership on audit and compensation committees improve a firm's financial reporting quality? Working paper, Drexel University.
    • (2008)
    • Chandar, N.1    Chang, H.2    Zheng, X.3
  • 20
    • 84871910243 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Contagion effect of restatements through common directorships. Working paper, Singapore Management University.
    • Chen, C. & Goh, B. 2009. Contagion effect of restatements through common directorships. Working paper, Singapore Management University.
    • (2009)
    • Chen, C.1    Goh, B.2
  • 21
    • 56649090947 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Earnings restatements, changes in CEO compensation, and firm performance
    • Cheng, Q. & Farber, D. 2008. Earnings restatements, changes in CEO compensation, and firm performance. The Accounting Review, 83: 1217-1250.
    • (2008) The Accounting Review , vol.83 , pp. 1217-1250
    • Cheng, Q.1    Farber, D.2
  • 22
    • 18944390386 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Equity incentives and earnings management
    • Cheng, Q. & Warfield, T. 2005. Equity incentives and earnings management. The Accounting Review, 80: 441-476.
    • (2005) The Accounting Review , vol.80 , pp. 441-476
    • Cheng, Q.1    Warfield, T.2
  • 23
    • 84871879526 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Boards: Does one size fit all? Working paper, Arizona State University and Purdue University.
    • Coles, J., Daniel, N., & Naveen, L. 2005. Boards: Does one size fit all? Working paper, Arizona State University and Purdue University.
    • (2005)
    • Coles, J.1    Daniel, N.2    Naveen, L.3
  • 24
    • 0032220381 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Board control, remuneration committees, and top management compensation
    • Conyon, M. J. & Peck, S. I. 1998. Board control, remuneration committees, and top management compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 41: 146-157.
    • (1998) Academy of Management Journal , vol.41 , pp. 146-157
    • Conyon, M.J.1    Peck, S.I.2
  • 25
    • 0001650996 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
    • Core, J., Holthausen, R., & Larcker, D. 1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 51: 371-406.
    • (1999) Journal of Financial Economics , vol.51 , pp. 371-406
    • Core, J.1    Holthausen, R.2    Larcker, D.3
  • 26
    • 28244478077 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Governance mechanisms and equity prices
    • Cremers, M. & Nair, V. 2005. Governance mechanisms and equity prices. Journal of Finance, 60: 2859-2894.
    • (2005) Journal of Finance , vol.60 , pp. 2859-2894
    • Cremers, M.1    Nair, V.2
  • 27
    • 0036997124 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual estimation errors
    • Dechow, P. & Dichev, I. 2002. The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual estimation errors. The Accounting Review, 77(supplement): 35-59.
    • (2002) The Accounting Review , vol.77 , Issue.SUPPL. , pp. 35-59
    • Dechow, P.1    Dichev, I.2
  • 28
    • 2142720242 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC
    • Dechow, P., Sloan, R., & Sweeney, A. 1996. Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research, 13: 1-36.
    • (1996) Contemporary Accounting Research , vol.13 , pp. 1-36
    • Dechow, P.1    Sloan, R.2    Sweeney, A.3
  • 29
    • 34547662432 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Why do corporate managers misstate financial statements? The role of option compensation and other factors
    • Efendi, J., Srivastava, A., & Swanson, E. 2007. Why do corporate managers misstate financial statements? The role of option compensation and other factors. Journal of Financial Economics, 85: 667-708.
    • (2007) Journal of Financial Economics , vol.85 , pp. 667-708
    • Efendi, J.1    Srivastava, A.2    Swanson, E.3
  • 30
    • 18944401883 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Restoring trust after fraud: Does corporate governance matter?
    • Farber, D. B. 2005. Restoring trust after fraud: Does corporate governance matter? The Accounting Review, 80: 539-561.
    • (2005) The Accounting Review , vol.80 , pp. 539-561
    • Farber, D.B.1
  • 31
    • 79951516282 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Why do CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations?
    • Feng, M., Ge, W., Luo, S., & Shevlin, T. 2011. Why do CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51: 21-36.
    • (2011) Journal of Accounting and Economics , vol.51 , pp. 21-36
    • Feng, M.1    Ge, W.2    Luo, S.3    Shevlin, T.4
  • 32
    • 0142219286 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments
    • Ferris, S., Jagannathan, M., & Pritchard, A. 2003. Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments. Journal of Finance, 58: 1087-1112.
    • (2003) Journal of Finance , vol.58 , pp. 1087-1112
    • Ferris, S.1    Jagannathan, M.2    Pritchard, A.3
  • 33
    • 33644891336 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Are busy boards effective monitors?
    • Fich, E. & Shivdasani, A. 2006. Are busy boards effective monitors? Journal of Finance, 61: 689-724.
    • (2006) Journal of Finance , vol.61 , pp. 689-724
    • Fich, E.1    Shivdasani, A.2
  • 35
    • 33845629684 scopus 로고
    • Bankruptcy, boards, banks and blockholders: Evidence on changes on corporate ownership and control when firms default
    • Gilson, S. 1990. Bankruptcy, boards, banks and blockholders: Evidence on changes on corporate ownership and control when firms default. Journal of Financial Economics, 27: 355-387.
    • (1990) Journal of Financial Economics , vol.27 , pp. 355-387
    • Gilson, S.1
  • 37
    • 0037788737 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Board leadership structure and CEO turnover
    • Goyal, V. & Park, C. 2002. Board leadership structure and CEO turnover. Journal of Corporate Finance, 8: 49-66.
    • (2002) Journal of Corporate Finance , vol.8 , pp. 49-66
    • Goyal, V.1    Park, C.2
  • 38
    • 35748949788 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Incentives to cheat: The influence of executive compensation and firm performance on financial misrepresentation
    • Harris, J. & Bromiley, P. 2007. Incentives to cheat: The influence of executive compensation and firm performance on financial misrepresentation. Organization Science, 18: 350-367.
    • (2007) Organization Science , vol.18 , pp. 350-367
    • Harris, J.1    Bromiley, P.2
  • 39
    • 0344153909 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Institutional investors and executive compensation
    • Hartzell, J. C. & Starks, L. T. 2003. Institutional investors and executive compensation. Journal of Finance, 58: 2351-2374.
    • (2003) Journal of Finance , vol.58 , pp. 2351-2374
    • Hartzell, J.C.1    Starks, L.T.2
  • 40
    • 85046754669 scopus 로고
    • Interorganizational imitation: The impact of interlocks on corporate acquisition activity
    • Haunschild, P. R. 1993. Interorganizational imitation: The impact of interlocks on corporate acquisition activity. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38: 564-592.
    • (1993) Administrative Science Quarterly , vol.38 , pp. 564-592
    • Haunschild, P.R.1
  • 41
    • 0032218716 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • When do interlocks matter: Alternate sources of information and interlock influence
    • Haunschild, P. R. & Beckman, C. M. 1998. When do interlocks matter: Alternate sources of information and interlock influence. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43: 815-844.
    • (1998) Administrative Science Quarterly , vol.43 , pp. 815-844
    • Haunschild, P.R.1    Beckman, C.M.2
  • 42
    • 0000125534 scopus 로고
    • Sample selection bias as a specification error
    • Heckman, J. 1979. Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica, 47: 153-161.
    • (1979) Econometrica , vol.47 , pp. 153-161
    • Heckman, J.1
  • 43
    • 0348194856 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO
    • Hermalin, B. & Weisbach, M. 1998. Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO. American Economic Review, 88: 96-118.
    • (1998) American Economic Review , vol.88 , pp. 96-118
    • Hermalin, B.1    Weisbach, M.2
  • 47
    • 84993848601 scopus 로고
    • The modern industrial revolution, exit and failure of internal control systems
    • Jensen, M. C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit and failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance, 48: 831-880.
    • (1993) Journal of Finance , vol.48 , pp. 831-880
    • Jensen, M.C.1
  • 48
    • 77952887064 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • CFOs and CEOs: Who have the most influence on earnings management?
    • Jiang, J., Petroni, K., & Wang, I. 2010. CFOs and CEOs: Who have the most influence on earnings management? Journal of Financial Economics, 96: 513-526.
    • (2010) Journal of Financial Economics , vol.96 , pp. 513-526
    • Jiang, J.1    Petroni, K.2    Wang, I.3
  • 49
    • 60749101480 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Ineffective corporate governance: Director busyness and board committee memberships
    • Jiraporn, P., Singh, M., & Lee, C. 2009. Ineffective corporate governance: Director busyness and board committee memberships. Journal of Banking & Finance, 33: 819-828.
    • (2009) Journal of Banking & Finance , vol.33 , pp. 819-828
    • Jiraporn, P.1    Singh, M.2    Lee, C.3
  • 50
    • 20444464511 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The association between corporate boards, audit committees, and management earnings forecasts: An empirical analysis
    • Karamanou, I. & Vafeas, N. 2005. The association between corporate boards, audit committees, and management earnings forecasts: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting Research, 43: 453-486.
    • (2005) Journal of Accounting Research , vol.43 , pp. 453-486
    • Karamanou, I.1    Vafeas, N.2
  • 51
    • 0001697340 scopus 로고
    • Directors' characteristics and committee membership: An investigation of type, occupation, tenure, and gender
    • Kesner, I. 1988. Directors' characteristics and committee membership: An investigation of type, occupation, tenure, and gender. Academy of Management Journal, 31: 66-85.
    • (1988) Academy of Management Journal , vol.31 , pp. 66-85
    • Kesner, I.1
  • 52
    • 70350375270 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Estimation and empirical properties of a firm-year measure of accounting conservatism
    • Khan, M. & Watts, R. 2009. Estimation and empirical properties of a firm-year measure of accounting conservatism. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 49: 132-150.
    • (2009) Journal of Accounting and Economics , vol.49 , pp. 132-150
    • Khan, M.1    Watts, R.2
  • 53
    • 84871869768 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The board of directors: A bargaining perspective? Working paper, University of Texas at Dallas.
    • Kieschnick, R. & Moussawi, R. 2004. The board of directors: A bargaining perspective? Working paper, University of Texas at Dallas.
    • (2004)
    • Kieschnick, R.1    Moussawi, R.2
  • 54
    • 0036013276 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Economic determinants of audit committee independence
    • Klein, A. 2002a. Economic determinants of audit committee independence. The Accounting Review, 77: 435-452.
    • (2002) The Accounting Review , vol.77 , pp. 435-452
    • Klein, A.1
  • 55
    • 0036331491 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management
    • Klein, A. 2002b. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33: 375-400.
    • (2002) Journal of Accounting and Economics , vol.33 , pp. 375-400
    • Klein, A.1
  • 56
    • 67650751609 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Board committees, CEO compensation, and earnings management
    • Laux, C. & Laux, V. 2009. Board committees, CEO compensation, and earnings management. The Accounting Review, 84: 869-891.
    • (2009) The Accounting Review , vol.84 , pp. 869-891
    • Laux, C.1    Laux, V.2
  • 57
    • 47749124164 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Back to the beginning: Persistence and the cross-section of corporate capital structure
    • Lemmon, M. L., Roberts, M. R., & Zender, J. F. 2008. Back to the beginning: Persistence and the cross-section of corporate capital structure. Journal of Finance, 63: 1575-1608.
    • (2008) Journal of Finance , vol.63 , pp. 1575-1608
    • Lemmon, M.L.1    Roberts, M.R.2    Zender, J.F.3
  • 58
    • 21144476214 scopus 로고
    • A modest proposal for improved corporate governance
    • Lipton, M. & Lorsch, J. 1992. A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. Business Lawyer, 48: 59-77.
    • (1992) Business Lawyer , vol.48 , pp. 59-77
    • Lipton, M.1    Lorsch, J.2
  • 59
    • 84881849521 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Board overlap, seat accumulation, and share prices
    • Loderer, C. & Peyer, U. C. 2002. Board overlap, seat accumulation, and share prices. European Financial Management, 8: 165-192.
    • (2002) European Financial Management , vol.8 , pp. 165-192
    • Loderer, C.1    Peyer, U.C.2
  • 61
    • 0039120840 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Debt, performance-based incentives, and firm performance
    • McConaughy, D. & Mishra, C. 1996. Debt, performance-based incentives, and firm performance. Financial Management, 25: 37-51.
    • (1996) Financial Management , vol.25 , pp. 37-51
    • McConaughy, D.1    Mishra, C.2
  • 62
    • 0011088442 scopus 로고
    • Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value
    • McConnell, J. & Servaes, H. 1990. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics, 27: 595-612.
    • (1990) Journal of Financial Economics , vol.27 , pp. 595-612
    • McConnell, J.1    Servaes, H.2
  • 63
    • 0036990780 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Discussion of "The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual estimation errors"
    • McNichols, M. 2002. Discussion of "The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual estimation errors". The Accounting Review, 77(supplement): 61-69.
    • (2002) The Accounting Review , vol.77 , Issue.SUPPL. , pp. 61-69
    • McNichols, M.1
  • 64
    • 33745289444 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Earnings management using classification shirting: An examination of core earnings and special items
    • McVay, S. 2006. Earnings management using classification shirting: An examination of core earnings and special items. The Accounting Review, 81: 501-532.
    • (2006) The Accounting Review , vol.81 , pp. 501-532
    • McVay, S.1
  • 65
    • 0039251035 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Board independence and compensation policies in large bank holding companies
    • Mishra, C. & Nielsen, J. 2000. Board independence and compensation policies in large bank holding companies. Financial Management, 29(3): 51-69.
    • (2000) Financial Management , vol.29 , Issue.3 , pp. 51-69
    • Mishra, C.1    Nielsen, J.2
  • 66
    • 0001427167 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • What do interlocks do? An analysis, critique, and assessment of research on interlocking directorates
    • Mizruchi, M. S. 1996. What do interlocks do? An analysis, critique, and assessment of research on interlocking directorates. Annual Review of Sociology, 22: 271-298.
    • (1996) Annual Review of Sociology , vol.22 , pp. 271-298
    • Mizruchi, M.S.1
  • 68
    • 20444498280 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Board independence and CEO pay
    • Ozerturk, S. 2005. Board independence and CEO pay. Economic Letters, 88: 260-265.
    • (2005) Economic Letters , vol.88 , pp. 260-265
    • Ozerturk, S.1
  • 69
    • 0034389392 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Accrual management to meet earnings targets: UK evidence pre- and post-Cadbury
    • Peasnell, K. V., Pope, P. F., & Young, F. 2000. Accrual management to meet earnings targets: UK evidence pre- and post-Cadbury. The British Accounting Review, 32: 415-445.
    • (2000) The British Accounting Review , vol.32 , pp. 415-445
    • Peasnell, K.V.1    Pope, P.F.2    Young, F.3
  • 71
    • 84871853561 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Accounting taste: Board member preference and corporate policy choices. Working Paper, MIT.
    • Richardson, S., Tuna, A. I., & Wysocki, P. D. 2003. Accounting taste: Board member preference and corporate policy choices. Working Paper, MIT.
    • (2003)
    • Richardson, S.1    Tuna, A.I.2    Wysocki, P.D.3
  • 72
    • 45349109969 scopus 로고
    • Management entrenchment: The case of manager-specific investments
    • Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. 1989. Management entrenchment: The case of manager-specific investments. Journal of Financial Economics, 25: 123-139.
    • (1989) Journal of Financial Economics , vol.25 , pp. 123-139
    • Shleifer, A.1    Vishny, R.2
  • 73
    • 2342505938 scopus 로고
    • The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies
    • Smith, C. W. & Watts, R. L. 1992. The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 32: 263-292.
    • (1992) Journal of Financial Economics , vol.32 , pp. 263-292
    • Smith, C.W.1    Watts, R.L.2
  • 75
    • 62249204393 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The effect of compensation committee quality on the association between CEO cash compensation and accounting performance
    • Sun, J. & Cahan, S. 2009. The effect of compensation committee quality on the association between CEO cash compensation and accounting performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17: 193-207.
    • (2009) Corporate Governance: An International Review , vol.17 , pp. 193-207
    • Sun, J.1    Cahan, S.2
  • 76
    • 0042182507 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The determinants of compensation committee membership
    • Vafeas, N. 2000. The determinants of compensation committee membership. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 8: 356-366.
    • (2000) Corporate Governance: An International Review , vol.8 , pp. 356-366
    • Vafeas, N.1
  • 78
    • 33749045633 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Institutional ownership and the quality of earnings
    • Velury, U. & Jenkins, D. 2006. Institutional ownership and the quality of earnings. Journal of Business Research, 59: 1043-1051.
    • (2006) Journal of Business Research , vol.59 , pp. 1043-1051
    • Velury, U.1    Jenkins, D.2
  • 80
    • 33845790377 scopus 로고
    • Outside directors and CEO turnover
    • Weisbach, M. 1988. Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics, 20: 431-460.
    • (1988) Journal of Financial Economics , vol.20 , pp. 431-460
    • Weisbach, M.1
  • 81
    • 0037409183 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Earnings management and corporate governance: The role of the board and the audit committee
    • Xie, B., Davidson, D. III, & DaDalt, P. 2003. Earnings management and corporate governance: The role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of Corporate Finance, 9: 295-316.
    • (2003) Journal of Corporate Finance , vol.9 , pp. 295-316
    • Xie, B.1    Davidson III, D.2    DaDalt, P.3
  • 82
    • 0030078208 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Higher market valuation for firms with a small board of directors
    • Yermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation for firms with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40: 185-211.
    • (1996) Journal of Financial Economics , vol.40 , pp. 185-211
    • Yermack, D.1
  • 83
    • 4344638635 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Remuneration, retention, and reputation incentives for outside directors
    • Yermack, D. 2004. Remuneration, retention, and reputation incentives for outside directors. Journal of Finance, 59: 2281-2308.
    • (2004) Journal of Finance , vol.59 , pp. 2281-2308
    • Yermack, D.1
  • 84
    • 77951803562 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Compensation/audit committee overlap and the design of compensation systems
    • Zheng, X. & Cullinan, C. 2010. Compensation/audit committee overlap and the design of compensation systems. International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, 7: 136-152.
    • (2010) International Journal of Disclosure and Governance , vol.7 , pp. 136-152
    • Zheng, X.1    Cullinan, C.2


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.