Strong managers, weak boards?

CESifo Economic Studies

Volumn 55, Issue 3-4, 2009, Pages 482-514

  Adams, Renée B ^a,b   Ferreira, Daniel ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND   (Australia)

^c LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Board composition; Board monitoring; Corporate governance; Ownership structure; Private benefits

Indexed keywords

CONFERENCE PROCEEDING; FIRM SIZE; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; MODELING; OWNERSHIP;

EID: 70849109124     PISSN: 1610241X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/cesifo/ifp023     Document Type: Conference Paper

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