You are known by the directors you keep: Reputable directors as a signaling mechanism for young firms

Management Science

Volumn 49, Issue 8, 2003, Pages 1003-1017

  Deutsch, Yuval ^a,b   Ross, Thomas W ^a,b  

^a YORK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

New ventures; Reputable directors; Signaling firm quality

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; INDUSTRY; INVESTMENTS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PERSONNEL; TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT;

NEW VENTURES; REPUTABLE DIRECTORS; SIGNALING FIRM QUALITY;

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE;

EID: 0141564572     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.49.8.1003.16399     Document Type: Article

References (42)

1. Akerlof, G. 1970. The market for "Lemons:" Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quart. J. Econom. 84, 488-500.
2. Amit, R., J. Brander, C. Zott. 1998. Why do venture capital firms exist? Theory and Canadian evidence. J. Bus. Venturing 13 441-466.
3. ____, L. Glosten, E. Muller. 1990. Entrepreneurial ability, venture investments and risk sharing. Management Sci. 36 1232-1245.
4. ____, ____, ____. 1993. Challenges to theory development in entrepreneurship research. J. Management Stud. 30 815-834.
5. Benjamin, B. A., J. M. Podolny. 1999. Status, quality, and social order in the California wine industry. Admin. Sci. Quart. 44 563-589.
6. Biglaiser, G. 1993. Middlemen as experts. Rand J. Econom. 24 212-223.
7. Carter, R., S. Manaster. 1990. Initial public offering and underwriter reputation. J. Finance 45 1045-1067.
8. Certo, S. T. 2003. Influencing IPO investors with prestige: Signaling with board structures. Acad. Management Rev. 28 432-446.
9. ____, C. M. Daily, D. R. Dalton. 2001. Signaling firm value through board structure: An investigation of initial public offerings. Entrepreneurship Theory Practice 26 33-50.
10. Cho, I. K., D. M. Kreps. 1987. Signaling games and stable equilibria. Quart. J. Econom. 102 179-221.
11. Daily, C. M., D. R. Dalton. 1992. The relationship between governance structure and corporate performance. J. Bus. Venturing 7 375-386.
12. ____, ____. 1993. Board of directors leadership and structure: Control and performance implications. Entrepreneurship Theory Practice 17 65-81.
13. Datar, S. M., G. A. Feltham, J. S. Hughes. 1991. The role of audits and audit quality in valuing new issues. J. Accounting Econom. 14 3-49.
14. Dowling, G. R. 1986. Managing your corporate images. Indust. Marketing Management 15 109-115.
15. Fama, E. F. 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. J. Political Econom. 88 288-307.
16. ____, M. C. Jensen. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. J. Law Econom. 26 301-325.
17. Finkelstein, S., D. Hambrick. 1996. Strategic Leadership: Top Executives and their Effects on Organizations. West Publishing Company, Minneapolis, MN.
18. Finkle, T. A. 1998. The relationship between boards of directors and initial public offerings in the biotechnology industry. Entrepreneurship Theory Practice 22 5-29.
19. Fombrun, C., M. Shanley. 1990. What's in the name? Reputation building and corporate strategy. Acad. Management J. 33, 233-258.
20. Fudenberg, D. J. Tirole. 1992. Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
21. Gatewood, R. D., M. A. Gowan, G. J. Lautenschlager. 1993. Corporate image, recruitment image, and initial job choice decisions. Acad. Management J. 36 (2) 414-427.
22. Gibbons, R. 1992. Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
23. Johnson, J., R. Miller. 1988. Investment banker prestige and the underpricing of initial public offerings. Financial Management 17 19-29.
24. Johnson, R. A., C. M. Daily, A. E. Elsstrand. 1996. Board of directors: A review and research agenda. J. Management 22 409-438.
25. Kihlstrom, R. E., M. H. Riordan. 1984. Advertising as a signal. J. Political Econom. 92 427-450.
26. McGuire, J., A. Sundgren, T. Schneeweis. 1988. Corporate social responsibility and firm financial performance. Acad. Management J. 31 854-872.
27. Mizruchi, M. S. 1983. Who controls whom? An examination of the relation between management and boards of directors in large American corporations. Acad. Management Rev. 8 426-436.
28. ____. 1996. What do interlocks do? An analysis, critique, and assessment of research on interlocking directorates. Amer. J. Soc. 83 340-363.
29. Pfeffer, J. 1972. Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: The organization and its environment. Admin. Sci. Quart. 17 218-229.
30. ____, G. R. Salancik. 1978. The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective. Harper & Row, New York.
31. Podolny, J. M. 1994. Market uncertainty and the social character of economic exchange. Admin. Sci. Quart. 39 458-483.
32. Provan, K. G. 1980. Board power and organizational effectiveness among human services agencies. Acad. Management J. 23 221-236.
33. Rasmusen, E. 2001. Games and Information, 3rd ed. Blackwell Publishers, Malden, MA.
34. Schoorman, F. D., M. H. Bezerman, R. S. Atkins 1981. Interlock directorates: A strategy for reducing environmental uncertainty. Acad. Management J. 6 243-251.
35. Selznick, P. 1949. TVA and the Grass Roots. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.
36. Shapiro, C. 1983. Premiums for high quality products as returns to reputations. Quart. J. Econom. 98 659-679.
37. Spence, A. M. 1974. Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
38. Stinchcombe, A. L. 1965. Organizations and social structure. J. G. March, ed. Handbook of Organizations. Rand McNally, Chicago, IL.
39. Stuart, T. E., H. Hoang, R. C. Hybels. 1999. Interorganizational endorsements and the performance on entrepreneurial ventures. Admin. Sci. Quart. 44 315-349.
40. Tadelis, S. 1999. What's in the name? Reputation as tradable asset. Amer. Econom. Rev. 89 548-563.
41. Tinic, S. 1998. Anatomy of initial public offerings of common stock. J. Finance 43 789-822.
42. Weigelt, K., C. Camerer. 1988. Reputation and corporate strategy: A review of recent theory and application. Strategic Management J. 9(5) 443-454.