The structural elaboration of board independence: Executive power, institutional logics, and the adoption of CEO-only board structures in U.S. corporate governance

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 57, Issue 6, 2014, Pages 1834-1858

  Joseph, John ^a   Ocasio, William ^b   Mcdonnell, Mary Hunter ^c  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84918498575     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/amj.2012.0253     Document Type: Article

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