The evolution of corporate governance: Power redistribution brings boards to life

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 15, Issue 5, 2007, Pages 780-797

  Anderson, David W ^a   Melanson, Stewart J ^b   Maly, Jiri ^b  

^a Toronto Board of Trade Tower   (Canada)

^b NONE

Author keywords

Agency theory; Board of directors; Corporate governance reform; Institutional investors; Stewardship theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 34748851380     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00608.x     Document Type: Conference Paper

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