New directions in corporate governance

Annual Review of Sociology

Volumn 31, Issue , 2005, Pages 143-162

  Davis, Gerald F ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Financial markets; Institutional analysis; Organization theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 24644479706     PISSN: 03600572     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.soc.31.041304.122249     Document Type: Review

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