An organizational approach to comparative corporate governance: Costs, contingencies, and complementarities

Organization Science

Volumn 19, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 475-492

  Aguilera, Ruth V ^a   Filatotchev, Igor ^b   Gospel, Howard ^c   Jackson, Gregory ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b CITY UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^c KING'S COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Board independence; Comparative corporate governance; Complementarities; Contingencies; Corporate governance; Costs; Effectiveness; France; Germany; Information disclosure; Insider control; Institutional; Italy; Japan; Organizational environments; Russia

Indexed keywords

EID: 46749095659     PISSN: 10477039     EISSN: 15265455     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/orsc.1070.0322     Document Type: Article

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