Restoring trust after fraud: Does corporate governance matter?

Accounting Review

Volumn 80, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 539-561

  Farber, David B ^a  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency costs; Audit committee; Corporate governance; Credible financial reporting; Fraud; Independent directors; Investor trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 18944401883     PISSN: 00014826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/accr.2005.80.2.539     Document Type: Article

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