Moderators of the relationship between director stock-based compensation and firm performance

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 15, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 1384-1393

  Cordeiro, James J ^a   Veliyath, Rajaram ^b   Romal, Jane B ^a  

^a STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^b KENNESAW STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency theory; External monitoring; Investment opportunity set; Outside director compensation incentives; Performance; Stock based incentives

Indexed keywords

EID: 37149034095     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00652.x     Document Type: Article

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