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Volumn 28, Issue 6, 2015, Pages 1588-1622

Does takeover activity cause managerial discipline? Evidence from international M&A laws

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EID: 84942944727     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhv002     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (161)

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