How CEOs protect themselves against dismissal: A social status perspective

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 37, Issue 6, 2016, Pages 1107-1117

  Flickinger, Miriam ^a   Wrage, Markus ^a   Tuschke, Anja ^a   Bresser, Rudi ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

^b FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

board interlocks; CEO dismissal; corporate elite; outside directors; social status

Indexed keywords

BOARD INTERLOCKS; CEO DISMISSAL; CORPORATE ELITE; OUTSIDE DIRECTORS; SOCIAL STATUS;

PLANNING;

EID: 84928966541     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.2382     Document Type: Article

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