The quad model for identifying a corporate director's potential for effective monitoring: Toward a new theory of board sufficiency

Academy of Management Review

Volumn 40, Issue 3, 2015, Pages 323-344

  Hambrick, Donald C ^a   Misangyi, Vilmos F ^a   Park, Chuljin A ^a  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84940747461     PISSN: 03637425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/amr.2014.0066     Document Type: Article

References (118)

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