Board composition, board effectiveness, and the observed form of takeover bids

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 1185-1215

  Bange, Mary M ^a   Mazzeo, Michael A ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 7044264756     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhh001     Document Type: Review

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