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Volumn 96, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 195-214

When are outside directors effective?

Author keywords

Board regulations; Corporate governance; Firm performance; Information asymmetry; Outside directors

Indexed keywords


EID: 77951208665     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2009.12.004     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (668)

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