Performance feedback and firm risk taking: The moderating effects of CEO and outside director stock options

Organization Science

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 262-282

  Lim, Elizabeth N K ^a   McCann, Brian T ^b  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Behavioral theory; CEOs; Firm risk taking; Outside directors; Performance feedback; Stock option grants

Indexed keywords

EID: 84893405298     PISSN: 10477039     EISSN: 15265455     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/orsc.2013.0830     Document Type: Article

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