Shareholder influence over director nomination via proxy access: Implications for agency conflict and stakeholder value

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 33, Issue 12, 2012, Pages 1431-1451

  Campbell, Joanna Tochman ^a   Campbell, T Colin ^b   Sirmon, David G ^c   Bierman, Leonard ^d   Tuggle, Christopher S ^e  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS   (United States)

^b MIAMI UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

^d TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^e UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA LINCOLN   (United States)

Author keywords

agency theory; board of directors; corporate governance; proxy; regulation

Indexed keywords

AGENCY THEORY; BOARD OF DIRECTORS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; PROXY; REGULATION;

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT; INDUSTRY;

SHAREHOLDERS;

EID: 84867880411     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.1989     Document Type: Article

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