Disaggregating the agency contract: The effects of monitoring, incentive alignment, and term in office on agent decision making

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 40, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 584-602

  Tosi, Henry L ^a   Katz, Jeffrey P ^a   Gomez Mejia, Luis R ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031529353     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/257054     Document Type: Article

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