Agents watching agents?: Evidence from pension fund ownership and firm value

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 63, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 99-131

  Woidtke, Tracie ^a  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Corporate governance; Institutional investors; Ownership structure

Indexed keywords

EID: 0043213086     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00091-5     Document Type: Article

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