Board social capital and excess CEO returns

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 2016, Pages 498-520

  Sauerwald, Steve ^a   Lin, Zhiang ^b   Peng, Mike W ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

Author keywords

board of directors; board social capital; excess CEO returns; financial alignment; normative pressures

Indexed keywords

MANAGEMENT; PLANNING;

BOARD OF DIRECTORS; EXCESS CEO RETURNS; FINANCIAL RETURNS; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; NORMATIVE PRESSURES; SHAREHOLDER RETURNS; SOCIAL CAPITALS;

INVESTMENTS;

EID: 84962253368     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.2339     Document Type: Article

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