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Volumn 97, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 12-32

Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors?

Author keywords

Director independence; Director influence; Governance; Interlocked boards; New director appointment

Indexed keywords


EID: 77952675289     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.01.003     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (259)

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