Board control, remuneration committees, and top management compensation

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 41, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 146-157

  Conyon, Martin J ^a   Peck, Simon I ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032220381     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/257099     Document Type: Article

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