Behavioral Agency Theory: New Foundations for Theorizing About Executive Compensation

Journal of Management

Volumn 41, Issue 4, 2015, Pages 1045-1068

  Pepper, Alexander ^a   Gore, Julie ^b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SURREY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

agency theory; behavioral theory; bonuses and benefits; compensation; motivation; top management teams

Indexed keywords

EID: 84930532091     PISSN: 01492063     EISSN: 15571211     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0149206312461054     Document Type: Article

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