Will disclosure of friendship ties between directors and CEOs yield perverse effects?

Accounting Review

Volumn 89, Issue 4, 2014, Pages 1545-1563

  Rose, Jacob M ^a   Rose, Anna M ^a   Norman, Carolyn Strand ^b   Mazza, Cheri R ^c  

^a BENTLEY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c SACRED HEART UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Directors; Disclosure; Earnings management; Friendship ties; Research and development

Indexed keywords

EID: 84928778575     PISSN: 00014826     EISSN: 15587967     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/accr-50734     Document Type: Article

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