Agency theory revisited: CEO return and shareholder interest alignment

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 53, Issue 5, 2010, Pages 1029-1049

  Nyberg, Anthony ^a   Fulmer, Ingrid ^a   Gerhart, Barry ^b   Carpenter, Mason ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77958568517     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/amj.2010.54533188     Document Type: Article

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