Rethinking agency theory: The view from law

Academy of Management Review

Volumn 35, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 294-314

  Lan, Luh Luh ^a   Heracleous, Loizos ^b  

^a NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952227040     PISSN: 03637425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/AMR.2010.48463335     Document Type: Article

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