The implementation of special attributes of CEO compensation contracts around M&A transactions

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 30, Issue 9, 2009, Pages 985-1011

  Bodolica, Virginia ^a   Spraggon, Martin ^a  

^a AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF SHARJAH   (United Arab Emirates)

Author keywords

Acquiring firms; Board of directors; CEO; Compensation protection devices; LTIPs; M A transactions

Indexed keywords

ACQUIRING FIRMS; BOARD OF DIRECTORS; CEO; COMPENSATION PROTECTION DEVICES; LTIPS;

MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS;

EID: 68249137002     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.779     Document Type: Article

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