The effects and unintended consequences of the sarbanes-oxley act on the supply and demand for directors

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 22, Issue 8, 2009, Pages 3287-3328

  Linck, James S ^a   Netter, Jeffry M ^a   Yang, Tina ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

^b CLEMSON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 68349158748     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhn084     Document Type: Article

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