Are busy boards effective monitors?

Journal of Finance

Volumn 61, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 689-724

  Fich, Eliezer M ^a   Shivdasani, Anil ^b  

^a DREXEL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644891336     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00852.x     Document Type: Article

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