Agency theory and bounded self-interest

Academy of Management Review

Volumn 41, Issue 2, 2016, Pages 276-297

  Bosse, Douglas A ^a   Phillips, Robert A ^a  

^a Department of Economics   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84962910388     PISSN: 03637425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/amr.2013.0420     Document Type: Article

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