Substitutes or complements? A configurational examination of corporate governance mechanisms

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 57, Issue 6, 2014, Pages 1681-1705

  Misangyi, Vilmos F ^a   Acharya, Abhijith G ^b  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b SINGAPORE MANAGEMENT UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84918577848     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/amj.2012.0728     Document Type: Review

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