The influence of CEO power on compensation contract design

Accounting Review

Volumn 90, Issue 4, 2015, Pages 1265-1306

  Abernethy, Margaret A ^a   Kuang, Yu Flora ^a   Qin, Bo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

Author keywords

Incentive contracts; Managerial power; Stock options

Indexed keywords

EID: 84954506742     PISSN: 00014826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/accr-50971     Document Type: Article

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