Connecting the Dots: Bringing External Corporate Governance into the Corporate Governance Puzzle

Academy of Management Annals

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 2015, Pages 483-573

  Aguilera, Ruth V ^a,b   Desender, Kurt ^c   Bednar, Michael K ^d   Lee, Jun Ho ^d  

^a NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b ESADE BUSINESS SCHOOL   (Spain)

^c UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

^d UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84930920989     PISSN: 19416520     EISSN: 19416067     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/19416520.2015.1024503     Document Type: Article

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