Complementarity in monitoring and bonding: More intense monitoring leads to higher executive compensation

Academy of Management Perspectives

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 57-74

  Hoskisson, Robert E ^a   Castleton, Mark W ^a   Withers, Michael C ^a  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 67650482307     PISSN: 15589080     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/AMP.2009.39985541     Document Type: Article

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