Distracted directors: Does board busyness hurt shareholder value?

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 113, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 404-426

  Falato, Antonio ^a   Kadyrzhanova, Dalida ^b   Lel, Ugur ^c  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^c PAMPLIN COLLEGE OF BUSINESS   (United States)

Author keywords

Busy directors; Director and CEO death; Firm valuation; Independent directors; Multiple directorship

Indexed keywords

EID: 84904902464     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.05.005     Document Type: Article

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