Governance bundles, firm performance, and the substitutability and complementarity of governance mechanisms

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 17, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 646-660

  Ward, Andrew J ^a   Brown, Jill A ^b   Rodriguez, Dan ^c  

^a LEHIGH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b LEHIGH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Corporate governance; Governance bundles; Stewardship theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 69949131598     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2009.00766.x     Document Type: Article

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