Independent director incentives: Where do talented directors spend their limited time and energyα

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 111, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 406-429

  Masulis, Ronald W ^a   Mobbs, Shawn ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA   (United States)

Author keywords

Busy directors; Director incentives; Firm performance; Firm reputation; Labor markets

Indexed keywords

EID: 84891661510     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.10.011     Document Type: Article

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