What I like about you: A multilevel study of shareholder discontent with director monitoring

Organization Science

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 675-687

  Hillman, Amy J ^a   Shropshire, Christine ^b   Certo, S Trevis ^a   Dalton, Dan R ^c   Dalton, Catherine M ^c  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

^c INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Boards of directors; Monitoring; Shareholders

Indexed keywords

EID: 79959239077     PISSN: 10477039     EISSN: 15265455     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/orsc.1100.0542     Document Type: Article

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