Corporate governance, takeovers, and top-management compensation: Theory and evidence

Management Science

Volumn 48, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 453-469

  Cyert, Richard M ^a   Kang, Sok Hyon ^a,b   Kumar, Praveen ^a,b  

^a GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate Governance and Board of Directors; Default Risk; Stock Options and CEO Compensation; Takeover Threats

Indexed keywords

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT; MANAGERS; REGRESSION ANALYSIS; SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE;

COMPENSATION (PERSONNEL);

EID: 0036541598     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.48.4.453.205     Document Type: Article

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