Is disclosure an effective cleansing mechanism? the dynamics of compensation peer benchmarking

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 806-839

  Faulkender, Michael ^a   Yang, Jun ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^b INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84874248693     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhs115     Document Type: Article

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