Legal institutions, board diligence, and top executive pay

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 1-12

  Brenner, Steffen ^a,c   Schwalbach, Joachim ^b,c  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Department of International Management ^*

^c HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Board of directors; Corporate governance; Executive remuneration (compensation)

Indexed keywords

EID: 58449098978     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2008.00720.x     Document Type: Article

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