The role of nominating committees and director reputation in shaping the labor market for directors: An empirical assessment

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 18, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 557-574

  Eminet, Aurélien ^a   Guedri, Zied ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE LYON   (France)

^b EMLYON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (France)

Author keywords

Corporate Governance; Director Reputation; France; Labor Market for Directors; Nominating Committee

Indexed keywords

EID: 78049441440     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00814.x     Document Type: Article

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