Comprehension and computation in Bayesian problem solving

Frontiers in Psychology

Volumn 6, Issue , 2015, Pages

  Johnson, Eric D ^a,b   Tubau, Elisabet ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BARCELONA   (Spain)

^b and Behavior ^*  (Spain)

Author keywords

Bayesian reasoning; individual differences; mathematical problem solving; numeracy; set subset reasoning; text comprehension

Indexed keywords

EID: 85119139841     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16641078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00938     Document Type: Review

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